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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This purpose of this paper is to examine the direct effects of institutional quality on 
human rights abuses in transition economies. We make use of an alternative empirical 
approach for evaluation of institutional system‟s development in transition economies 
developed by Chousa et al. (2005). To assess this relationship, along with institutional 
quality index, which is an operational indicator of institutional system dynamics to 
observe institutional reforms-economic growth interdependence, we also construct cost of 
decline in institutional quality and transition from communist to reforms years variables. 
We also evaluate the effect of institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by 
the level of transition from communist to reforms years.  The empirical work reveals that 
an improvement in institutional quality increases government respect for human rights. 
While, any decline in institutional quality leads to human rights abuses. The results also 
show that government respect for human rights are strongly associated with transition 
towards reforms years. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Does improvement in institutional quality lead to increase in governments‟ respect for 
human rights? This question is important for both practical and theoretical reasons. To 
begin with, it is an increasingly important policy issue in the field of growth and equity. 
Eminent experts like Sen (1999) and Khan (1989 & 2004) has advocated for freedom as 
wherewithal for an institutional settings and formal freedom and deep democracy are 
virtues of efficiency and equity. Chousa et al. (2005) highlight the role of institutions, 
institutional reforms and rule of law which leads to creation of innovative systems for 
economic growth and development.  A large number of studies have questioned the 
importance and contribution of institutional quality on growth and development. This 
question has been an important debatable topic in the economic literature. There are  
number of studies which have pointed out the impact of institutional quality on growth 
and observe that institutional quality as an important prerequisite for growth (Kornai, 
2000; Acemoglu et al. 2002; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2003; Johnson et al. 2000; Acemoglu 
et al. 2004; Bekaert et al. 2004 and Chousa at al., 2005).  
 
Exhibit 1: Institutional Quality & Human Rights 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The literature shows that there is a positive impact of development and equity process on 
human rights (Mitchell & Mc Cormick, 1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Davenport 1995; 
Blanton, 1999; Frey et al., 1999; Milner, 2002; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; Spar, 
1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2005; Blanton & Blanton, 2006 
and Eriksen & de Soysa, 2008). As highlighted in exhibit 1, better institutional quality 
should lead to increase in efficiency and equity and there by growth and development. 
Inturn growth and development process leads to higher respect for human rights as 
development process tends to reduce threats and the likelihood of state repression is less. 
To assess the impact of institutional quality on human rights in transition economies, we 
make use of the operational index developed by Chousa at al (2005). They use shadow 
economy and barter trade volume indicators as proxies to evaluate the total efficiency of 
the economic institutions in transition economies. From this index, we then construct cost 
of decline in institutional quality variable to assess the cost associated with decline in 
institutional quality on human rights. This apart, we also examine the effect of 
institutional quality on human rights abuses conditioned by the level of transition from 
communist to reforms years. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 deals 
with research design and modelling institutional quality and human rights abuses. Section 
3 presents empirical results and section 4 concludes the study.  
Institutional 
Quality 
Growth & 
Development 
Efficiency 
Equity 
Respect for 
Human Rights 
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2. Modeling “Institutional Quality & Human Rights Abuses”   
 
To investigate the impact of institutional quality on Human rights abuses, it is convenient 
to define what we considered by Human Rights abuses. The concept of Human Rights 
abuses has always been problematic. However, we would like to take into account all 
those aspects, which in some or the other ways are related to abuses of human rights. 
Basically, we consider the “integrity of people”, “empowerment rights of people” and 
“state terrorism”. To capture these three broad issues, we take into account three widely-
used indicators dealing with Human rights abuses. These indicators are physical integrity 
rights, empowerment rights index and political terror scale
1
. Just similar to Dreher, 
Gassebner & Siemers (2007) we use all the three indices in our study separately. 
 
a. Physical Integrity Rights Index: 
 
The physical integrity rights index reported in the Human Rights Database (CIRI data) 
contain information about the pattern and sequence of government respect for physical 
integrity rights in addition to the level. Here, the pattern is defined as “the association of 
different levels of government respect for several physical integrity rights with a single, 
overall scale score” (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Sequence is defined as “the order in 
which governments have a propensity to violate particular physical integrity rights” 
(Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). The CIRI data are based on the human rights practices of 
governments and any of its agents, such as police or paramilitary forces. The CIRI 
measure is an additive index constructed from observations on torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no 
government respect for these four human rights to 8 which is full government respect for 
these four human rights. 
 
b. Empowerment Rights Index: 
 
Empowerment rights index is a more general way of defining human rights, which 
extends beyond state terrorism and includes various other issues related to political and 
civil rights of the people. The government respect for political rights and civil liberties is 
a 10-point additive scale constructed using probabilistic cumulative scale analysis 
(Richards, Gelleny & Sacko 2001). This is an additive index constructed from the 
Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers‟ Rights, Political Participation, and 
Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 which is no government respect for 
these five rights to 10 that is full government respect for these five rights. The source of 
information used for coding these five variables was from the U.S. State Department's 
annual country reports on Human Rights practices. To check for robustness of our results, 
we perform sensitivity analysis. For this we run the results by taking into consideration 
civil liberties constructed by Freedom House (results reported in Annexure – 2). 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Carleton & Stohl (1987), Gibney & Dalton (1997), Poe & Meernik (1995), Poe & Tate (1994), Stohl 
et al. (1984), Cingranelli & Richards (1999), Richards (1999), Zanger (2000), Neumayer (2005), Dreher, 
Gassebner & Siemers (2007), Eriksen & de Soysa (2008). 
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c. Political Terror Scale: 
 
Finally, our last measure of human rights abuses deals with political/state terrorism. We 
use data from the Political Terror Scales (PTS). The PTS data focus on the amount of 
respect a society gives to personal integrity rights, specifically the freedom from 
politically motivated imprisonment, torture and murder. This is developed by Gibney 
(2004), who provides data from 1980 onwards and later extended it back from 1976
2
. The 
PTS scores include two components. One is based on a codification of country 
information from Amnesty International‟s annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 
being best to 5 is worst
3
. The other scale is based on information from the U.S. 
Department of State‟s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  
 
The final codification is as follows: 
 
Score 1 : Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, 
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
Score 2 : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder 
is rare.  
 
Score 3 : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
 
Score 4 : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its 
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 
 
Score 5 : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 
ideological goals. 
 
Given the scores from 1 to 5, other major contentious issue is which indicator amongst 
the two should be used. Before deciding upon the selection, it is noteworthy to highlight 
the advantages and drawbacks of both these indicators. The study of Poe et al. (2001) 
points out that the State Department data is biased. They argue that the US State 
Department reports lower values (1 – best) for the countries which are allies of US on 
international political and diplomatic front. This effectively means that the Amnesty 
International data is unbiased. However, Neumayer (2005) point out that Amnesty 
International data though unbiased, covers only few countries in the early years, leaving 
aside those countries in which there were no or less human rights abuses. In this 
indecisive framework, we take the average score of both State Department and Amnesty 
International data.  
                                                 
2
 We thank Dr. Gibney for providing the data for all the three scores of PTS on request.  
3
 The data can be found at http://www.unca.edu/~mgibney 
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In the first model Physical Integrity Rights index is considered as dependent, while the 
second model considers Empowerment Rights index and the third model captures PTS in 
the same way. The three parsimonious models for Human Rights abuses are specified as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (3) 
 
Where: 
 
i t = country “i” at time “t” 
   = Intercept for the equations 
 Ω β = Regression Coefficient for variable “n” 
ε γ η = error terms for country “i” at time “t” 
 
This empirical analysis covers 20 transition economies (13 former Soviet Union countries 
and seven East European countries, see annexure 3) for the period 1993 to 2000. We use 
pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) method. We estimate all models using time 
dummies to estimate any effects of trending data. The pooled time-series cross-sectional 
Physical Integrity Rights = 1 + 2 Institutional Quality it + 3 Economic Growth Rate it + 4  
log (Economic Development) it + 5 War years it + 6 Pace years it + 
7 Political Regime it + 8 log (Population)it + 9 Ethnic 
Fractionalization it + 10 Socialist/British Legal System it  + 11 Cost 
of Decline in Institutional Quality it  + ε it 
Empowerment Rights = 1 + Ω2 Institutional Quality it + Ω3 Economic Growth Rate it + Ω4  
log (Economic Development) it + Ω5 War years it + Ω6 Pace years it + 
Ω7 Political Regime it + Ω8 log (Population)it + Ω9 Ethnic 
Fractionalization it + Ω10 Socialist/British Legal System it  + Ω11 Cost 
of Decline in Institutional Quality it  + γ it 
Political Terror Scale = 1 + β2 Institutional Quality it + β3 Economic Growth Rate it + β4  
log (Economic Development) it + β5 War years it + β6 Pace years it + β7 
Political Regime it + β8 log (Population)it + β9 Ethnic 
Fractionalization it + β10 Socialist/British Legal System it  + β11 Cost 
of Decline in Institutional Quality it  + η it 
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(TCSC) data may exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While these 
problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a 
more robust method for large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. 
However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing 
invalid statistical inferences. To deal with these problems, we estimated for all the 
models the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated 
standard errors are robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial 
correlation within the cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  
 
2. i. Main Independent variables: 
 
The main independent variables of the study are three: Institutional Quality index, cost of 
decline in Institutional Quality and conditional effect of transition towards reforms years 
from communist period. The description of each of these variables and its computations 
are defined as under: 
 
a. Institutional Quality Index: 
 
The primary independent variable of this study is the level of institutional quality. 
Institutional „market‟ conditions are the starting point for estimating the progress of 
institutional reforms in transition economies. The institutional market in transition 
economies is usually analyzed (e.g. Tambovtsev, 1998) in the following three segments: 
Formal – “white market”, Informal – “Shadow market”, including the “black” one and 
finally, Inherited – “Socialist market” (Chousa et al., 2005). Using them, we consider the 
institutional quality variable as defined and developed by Chousa et al. (2005). They 
construct this operational index which is in the range of 0 and 1. The effective 
institutional regimes would have the score of 1 and 0 otherwise. According to Chousa et 
al. (2005) the main advantage of the operational indicator over the simple weighted index 
is that in their index the “weights” are set by the market itself. Meaning, the need to 
consider separate components does not arise.  
 
b. Cost of Decline in Institutional Quality: 
 
The other hypothesis variable apart from institutional quality includes “cost of decline in 
Institutional Quality”. Our presumption is that an improvement in institutional quality 
leads to decline in human rights abuses. Based on this argument, we assume that any 
decline in institutional quality would lead to increase in human rights abuses. To capture 
the effect of cost of decline in institutional quality, we compute this variable in three 
steps: In the first step, we first name the dummy variable “decline in institutional quality” 
which take the value 1 whenever the original value of institutional quality declines from 
its immediate preceeding year and 0 otherwise. In the second stage, we compute the rate 
of growth of institutional quality. In the third and final step, we multiply three indicators 
to arrive at “cost of decline in institutional quality”, viz., decline in institutional quality, 
rate of growth of institutional quality and lagged value of original index of institutional 
quality. Thus, the cost of decline in Institutional Quality: 
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Institutional Quality (t-1) x ∆ Institutional Quality x Reversal in Institutional Quality4 
 
We introduce this variable for each model after the baseline model is performed to 
examine its impact on human rights abuses. 
 
c. Conditional effects of Transition to Reforms Years: 
 
We are interested to examine whether the impact of institutional quality on Human rights 
abuses is conditional to countries transiting from communist rule to reforms period. To 
capture this effect, we first calculate the ratio of the reforms period and years under 
communism to reflect the initial conditions of reforms process in transition economies. 
We then interact this ratio with institutional quality variable to capture the conditional 
effect. This effectively means that the coefficient values of this interactive variable 
should not only be positive for physical integrity, empowerment rights and negative for 
political terror scale, but also should be higher than that of original institutional quality 
variable. 
 
2. ii. Control Variables: 
 
Previous research on the violations of human rights has established that there are several 
key factors that explain why governments violate human rights (Carey & Poe, 2004, 
Landman, 2005 and Eriksen & de Soysa 2008). The literature shows that there is a 
positive impact of development and equity on human rights (Mitchell & Mc Cormick, 
1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Davenport 1995; Blanton, 1999; Frey et al., 1999; Milner, 
2002; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Mastruzzi 2005; Blanton & Blanton, 2006 and Eriksen & de Soysa, 2008). The models 
control the effects of development and growth by introducing logged value of per capita 
GDP in US$ PPP constant terms and the economic growth rate. The data for both these 
variables come from world development indicators of World Bank 2006.  
 
The literature shows that the level of democracy is a key variable associated with human 
rights. The democracy scores take shape as a discrete variable taking the value 1 if the 
polity IV, variable polity II, is greater than 6 on the 10-point scale and 0 if not (Jaggers & 
Gurr, 1995)
5
. The studies show that democracy affects rights only at very high levels 
(Davenport & Armstrong, 2004). Thus, we take the polity IV scores to capture for 
democracy levels. Following other prominent studies in literature we also take into 
account the log value of total population adapted from world development indicators of 
World Bank 2006. The countries with higher ethnic fractionalization often face the risk of 
ethnic wars. To capture this effect, we include the degree of ethnic fractionalization 
developed by Fearon & Laitin (2003).  Prominent studies like Poe and Tate (1994) and 
Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) Dreher, Gassebner & Siemers (2007) argue that civil war and 
peace years are important determinants of human rights abuses. Taking these studies as 
standard, we include the dummy variable 1 if civil war exists in the country and 0 
                                                 
4
 Note: ∆ denotes rate of growth of institutional quality & “t” represents current year. 
5
 The data can be accessed from http://www.colorado.edu/ IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html. 
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otherwise. We also include number of peace years for each country from 1993 to 2000. 
The peace years variable is included as the number of peace years since every last civil 
war occurred in a country. The data for both these variables come from the Uppsala 
database updated version of 2007. Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) 
argue that countries with British legal system are associated with lower human rights 
abuses to Socialistic legal system. This would be even more interesting in the context of 
transition economies as majority of these countries belong to former Soviet Union. We 
give the value 1 if the country has socialist legal system and 0 otherwise. Finally, we 
include the ratio of the reforms period and years under communism to reflect the initial 
conditions of reforms process in transition economies. The data for these ratios are 
already adapted from study of Chousa et al. (2005). 
 
3. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of institutional quality on 
Human Rights abuses in Transition economies are presented in table 1 and 2. The model 
1, 3 & 5 captures determinants of various types of Human rights abuses. They include, 
Empowerment Rights, Physical Integrity Rights and Political Terror Scale. These are 
tested against the main hypothesis variable namely, Institutional Quality. This is 
followed by three other models 2, 4 & 6 explaining the relationship between cost of 
decline in institutional quality and its effect on various types of human rights abuses. 
Additionally, the models 7, 8 & 9 take into consideration the interaction effect of 
institutional quality and reforms years to check whether the impact of institutional quality 
on human rights abuses is conditional upon transition process from communist period to 
reforms years. We control for heteroskedasticity using White Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors & covariance. Descriptive analysis is presented in annexure 1.  
 
In model – 1 (table 1) we find that institutional quality has significant positive effect on 
human rights abuses. The empowerment scores suggest that on a scale of 0 to 10, zero 
represent worst human rights abuses and 10 represent respect for human rights. Therefore 
the positive effect of institutional quality suggests a reduction in human rights abuses. An 
increase of 10% in institutional quality contributes to human rights respect by 0.20%. 
This is statistically significant at 1% confident level. The results are very similar in model 
2 (table 1) when we introduce cost of decline in institutional quality variable. We find 
that for an increase in 10% in cost of decline in institutional quality is increasing in 
human rights abuses by almost 15%. This is statistically significant at 10% confidence 
level. The other interesting findings in model 1 (table 1) include that of war and peace 
years. When we introduce war year dummy, we find a significant negative relationship 
with human rights. Similarly, when we include number of peace years in the same model 
we found that it is helping in reducing the human rights abuses. But we could not find 
any statistical significance for both variables. However, the coefficient values for the both 
differs as we find that for civil war dummy its slightly higher than peace years, 
suggesting that the risk of civil war is always detrimental to human rights abuses. 
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Table 1: Results of Institutional Quality & Human Rights equation 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
(ER)# 
Model  2 
(ER) 
Model  3 
(PIR)# 
Model  4 
(PIR) 
Model  5 
(PTS)# 
Model  6 
(PTS) 
Constant 
5.121 ** 
(2.681) 
5.126 ** 
(2.684) 
1.374 
(2.751) 
1.374 
(2.761) 
1.246  
(1.315) 
1.245 
(1.319) 
Institutional Quality 
0.002 * 
(0.001) 
0.002 * 
(0.000) 
0.002 ** 
(0.000) 
0.002 ** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 * 
(0.000) 
-0.002 * 
(0.000) 
Economic Growth 
0.014  
(0.019) 
0.013  
(0.019) 
-0.029  
(0.019) 
-0.029 *** 
(0.020) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.441 *** 
(0.285) 
0.432 *** 
(0.286) 
0.788 * 
(0.264) 
0.787 * 
(0.269) 
-0.079 
(0.112) 
-0.077 
(0.112) 
Log(Population) 
-0.230 *** 
(0.125) 
-0.226 *** 
(0.126) 
-0.193 *** 
(0.105) 
-0.193 *** 
(0.105) 
0.096 *** 
(0.059) 
0.096 *** 
(0.059) 
Democracy 
0.116 * 
(0.025) 
0.115 * 
(0.025) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
2.807 * 
(0.933) 
2.817 * 
(0.932) 
0.723 
(0.743) 
0.724 
(0.746) 
-0.523 
(0.310) 
-0.524 *** 
(0.311) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.925 ** 
(0.413) 
-0.947 ** 
(0.416) 
0.519 *** 
(0.337) 
0.517 *** 
(0.339) 
0.007 
(0.211) 
0.010 
(0.213) 
Civil War 
-0.310 
(0.449) 
-0.315 
(0.450) 
-2.628 * 
(0.394) 
-2.629 * 
(0.396) 
1.568 * 
(0.322) 
1.569 * 
(0.323) 
Peace Years 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Number of Reform Years to 
Years in communist rule 
31.29 * 
(5.941) 
31.35 * 
(5.952) 
15.817 * 
(4.806) 
15.823 * 
(4.824) 
-5.927 * 
(2.091) 
-5.936 * 
(2.097) 
Cost of Decline of Institutional 
Quality 
------ -0.149 *** 
(0.088) 
------ -0.011 + 
(0.053) 
------ 0.024 
(0.023) 
Time 
-0.709 * 
(0.113) 
-0.709 * 
(0.113) 
-0.338 * 
(0.094) 
-0.338 * 
(0.095) 
0.179 * 
(0.041) 
0.179 * 
(0.041) 
 
R-squared 0.694149 0.695640 0.511415 0.511433 0.549676 0.549995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.671416 0.670795 0.475101 0.471550 0.516206 0.513260 
S.E. of regression 1.486145 1.487550 1.303382 1.307783 0.620162 0.622047 
Log likelihood -284.1829 -283.7918 -263.1872 -263.1842 -144.3494 -144.2926 
F-statistic 30.53592 27.99844 14.08322 12.82333 16.42291 14.97193 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Note: # Dependent Variables: ER = Empowerment Rights; PIR = Physical Integrity Rights; PTS = Political 
Terror Scale. * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 
10% confidence level & + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for 
Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
The positive relationship found between economic growth and development suggests that 
improvement in quality of life through higher growth and development process help 
reduce economic insecurity thereby reducing social tensions and unrests in the society. 
Though both bare positive signs, only economic development is statistically significant at 
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10% confidence level. We also find that an increase in population levels exerts pressure 
on human rights abuses. We also find that ethnic fractionalization is leading to 
improvement in human rights abuses and these results are consistent in all the models. 
We find that an improvement in democracy levels is associated with higher government 
respect for human rights. A 10% increase in democracy levels is leading to 12% increase 
in respect for human rights. This shows that democracy levels are associated with lower 
human rights abuses in comparison to autocratic regimes. But the most important finding 
of the study related to transition economies is the effect of number of reforms years to 
communist period. We find that a significant positive association with this variable, 
suggesting that greater the transition from communist era to reforms period, lower the 
human rights abuses. An increase of 3129% in human rights respect for every 10% 
increase in the coefficient value of this variable shows how robust the relationship is. 
This effect remains the same in model 2 (table 1) with statistical significance at 1% 
confidence level in both models.    
 
In model 3 and 4 (see table 1) the institutional quality remains constant with 1% 
significance and coefficient value of 0.20%. We also find statistical significance for 
economic development and civil war variables, the signs remain the same. Also, the 
transition from communist years to reforms era has a significant positive impact on 
human rights respect. In model 4 we introduce cost of decline in institutional quality 
variable. Though we find negative impact on human rights respect, its significance is 
week at 15% confidence level. But nevertheless, the sign shows that decline in 
institutional quality have an adverse impact on human rights. However the effect of 
introducing this variable does not change the results of our hypothesis variable, 
institutional quality, which still remains significant at 1% confidence level.  
 
The results displayed in models 5 and 6 (see table 1) reconfirm significant positive 
impact of institutional quality on government respect for Human rights. Whereas in 
model 7, the negative sign suggests that increase in institutional quality help reduce the 
human rights abuses. This is because the dependent variable is Political Terror Scale 
which ranges from 1 to 5 points, with 1 suggesting abuse and 5 is respect for human 
rights. Therefore, a negative value of the coefficient of institutional quality suggest 
decline in human rights abuses. In all these models we see the move towards reforms 
period is helping reduce human rights abuses. Though cost of decline in institutional 
quality bears positive sign suggesting that decline in institutional quality increases human 
rights abuses, but is not statistically significant (model 6, table 1).  
 
Table 2: Results of conditional effects of reforms years & Human Rights equation 
 
 
Variables 
Model 7 
(ER) # 
Model  8 
(PIR) # 
Model  9 
(PTS) # 
    
Constant 
5.131 *** 
(2.690) 
1.397 
(2.752) 
1.232 
(1.315) 
Economic Growth 
0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Log (Economic Development) 0.450 *** 0.788 * -0.080 
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(0.284) (0.264) (0.111) 
Log(Population) 
-0.235 *** 
(0.125) 
-0.194 *** 
(0.104) 
0.098 *** 
(0.058) 
Democracy 
0.117 * 
(0.025) 
0.003 
(0.025) 
-0.016 *** 
(0.010) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
2.793 * 
(0.936) 
0.729 
(0.742) 
-0.523 *** 
(0.310) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.903 ** 
(0.410) 
0.518 *** 
(0.337) 
0.002 
(0.211) 
Civil War 
-0.307 
(0.449) 
-2.626 * 
(0.395) 
1.566 * 
(0.322) 
Peace Years 
0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Number of Reform Years to Years in 
communist rule 
31.167 * 
(5.947) 
15.743 * 
(4.798) 
-5.861 * 
(2.092) 
Institutional Quality X Number of Reform 
Years to Years in communist rule 
0.009 * 
(0.002) 
0.004 ** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 * 
(0.001) 
Time 
-0.711 * 
(0.113) 
-0.339 * 
(0.095) 
0.180 * 
(0.040) 
 
R-squared 0.692973 0.511874 0.549772 
Adjusted R-squared 0.670154 0.475594 0.516309 
S.E. of regression 1.488998 1.302769 0.620096 
Log likelihood -284.4898 -263.1120 -144.3323 
F-statistic 30.36750 14.10911 16.42930 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total Observations 160 160 160 
Note: # Dependent Variables: ER = Empowerment Rights; PIR = Physical Integrity Rights; PTS = 
Political Terror Scale; * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; & *** 
Significant at 10% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
Our next three models 7, 8 & 9 (see table 2) examine the conditional effects of transition 
from communist period towards reforms years on human rights buses through 
institutional quality. In model 7 (table 2) we find that the interaction effect of reforms 
years and institutional quality is positive and 1% statistically significant. For every10% 
increase in the interaction effect variable is leading to an increase of 0.89% respect for 
empowering rights. Yet, the reforms year variable remains intact as in model 1 with 
significance level of 1%. In model 8 and 9 we find the results to be same as in previous 
model. The interaction effect variable exerts a 1% significant positive impact on uplifting 
the human rights, while the reforms year variable remains positive and significant at 1% 
confidence level. 
 
Another significant finding of these results is the comparison of the coefficient values of 
this interactive variable with that of original institutional quality variable presented in 
models 1 to 6 (see table 1). We find that the coeffients values of this interactive variable 
are higher than original institutional quality variable. The results from these models 
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suggest that indeed transition process from communist era towards greater reforms period 
is helping significantly to improve institutional quality thereby lower human rights 
abuses in transition economies. In the light of these findings, we feel that it is extremely 
important for these economies to carry forward the reforms process.   
 
4. Summary & Conclusion 
 
The results reported in this study have important implications for increasing our 
understanding of the relationship between institutional quality and government respect 
for human rights in transition economies. Using pooled regression analysis on a data set 
comprising 20 transition economies for the period 1993 - 2000, we find systematic 
evidence of an association between institutional quality and increased government respect 
for Human rights. Our evidence strongly puts forward the point that better institutional 
quality always leads to lower human rights abuses. Moreover, the analysis points to the 
need to consider institutional quality and human rights on a broader scope than is done in 
the present study. In the first place, we obviously believe that the data series for 
institutional quality should be extended till 2006
6
. Secondly, the index of institutional 
quality should be constructed for all the countries across which can then give us correct 
estimates of its effects of Human rights abuses in general.  
 
Our findings show that improvement in institutional quality is leading to increased 
government respect for all forms of human rights viz., physical integrity rights, 
empowerment rights and political terror scale. We find that 10% increase in institutional 
quality is leading to 0.20% increase in respect for human rights. The results are robust 
and significant at 1% confidence level across all the models. We also constructed the 
variable: cost of decline in institutional quality. We find that whenever the cost of decline 
in institutional quality is on rise, the government respect for human rights would decline. 
Infact the coefficient value of cost of decline in institutional quality is much higher than 
that of institutional quality itself. This show how sensitive the human rights abuses are to 
a slight decline in institutional quality, because the cost associated is higher. We also 
found that as we increase number of reforms years to communist years, the government 
respect towards human rights is significantly improving. The coeffients values are highest 
amongst all the variables and the results are found to be consistent in all the models. In 
the final three models (table 2), we examined whether the effect of institutional quality on 
human rights abuses is conditional to increase in number of reforms years to communist 
years. We find that this conditional effect has a significant positive impact on human 
rights. Meaning, transition process from communist era towards greater reforms period is 
helping significantly to improve institutional quality thereby leading towards lower 
human rights abuses in transition economies. In the light of these findings, we feel that it 
is extremely important for these economies to carry forward the reforms process.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Due to lack of availability of data for “barter trade” indicator, Chousa et al (2005) data ends at 2000. 
 13 
5. References 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J (2002): Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional 
Change and Economic Growth, MIT, Sloan School of Management, Working paper No. 4269-02. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2004): Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional 
Change and Economic Growth, MIT, Sloan School of Management, Working paper No. 4269-02 
(revised version). 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. (2003): Unbundling institutions, NBER Working Paper No. 9934. 
 
Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers (2007): Does Terror Threaten Human 
Rights? Evidence from Panel Data, Working papers 07-156, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH 
Zurich. 
 
Boswell, Terry and William J. Dixon (1990): Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National 
Analysis, American Sociological Review 55, pp. 540-59 
 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R., & Lundblad, C. (2005): Does financial liberalization spur growth?, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 57, pp.3-55.. 
 
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey (1999): Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports 
and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries, Journal of Peace Research 36 (2), 233-
244 
 
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey (2005): Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and 
U.S. Arms Exports, International Studies Quarterly 49 (4), pp. 647-667. 
 
Chousa, Juan Pin˜eiro, Khan, Haider A., Melikyan, Davit & Tamazian, Artur (2005): Assessing 
institutional efficiency, growth and integration, Emerging Markets Review 6, pp. 69– 84 
 
Cingranelli, David L. & David L. Richards (1999): Measuring Level, Pattern & Sequence of 
Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights‟, International Studies Quarterly 43(2), pp. 
407–417 
 
Carlton, David & Michael Stohl, (1987): The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance 
Policy, American Journal of Political Science. 31 (4), pp. 1002-1018 
 
Davenport, Christian & David A. II Armstrong (2004): Democracy and the Violation of Human 
Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996, American Journal of Political Science 48 (3), 
pp. 538–554. 
 
Davenport, Christian. (1995): Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An 
Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, American Journal of Political Science 39 (3), 
pp. 683-713. 
 
Davenport, Christian & David A. II Armstrong (2004): Democracy and the Violation of Human 
Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996‟, American Journal of Political Science 48(3), 
pp. 538–554 
 
 14 
Fearon, James D. & David D. Laitin (2003): Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War‟, American 
Political Science Review 97 (1), pp. 1–16. 
 
Gibney, Matthew J. (2004): The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the 
Response to Refugees. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Gibney, Mark & Mathew Dalton (1997): The Political Terror Scale, In Human Rights & 
Developing Countries, edited by D. L. Cingranelli. Greenwich: JAI Press 
 
Jaggers, Keith & Ted R. Gurr, (1995): Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III 
Data‟, Journal of Peace Research 32, pp. 469–482. 
 
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C. (2000): Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional 
reform: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine compared, The Economics of Transition, 
18, pp. 1 – 36. 
 
Khan, Haider A (1989): Macroeconomic effects of technology choice: multiplier and structural 
path analysis, Journal of Policy Modeling 11 (1), pp. 
 
Khan, Haider A (2004): Development as Freedom, Discussion Paper No. F-257 CIRJE, Graduate 
School of Economics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Kornai, J (2000): The road to free economy: after ten years, Voprosi, Economiki 12, pp. 42– 46. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi (2004): Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford 
University Press, vol. 18(2), pp. 253-287. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel (2004): Corruption, Governance and Security: Challenges for the Rich 
Countries and the World," MPRA Paper 8207, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
Mitchell & Mc Cormick, (1988): Economic & Political Explanations of Human Rights 
Violations, World Politics, 40, pp. 476-498. 
 
Milner, Wesley T (2002): Economic Globalization and Rights: An Empirical Analysis, In 
Globalization and Human Rights, ed. Alison Brysk. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Neumayer, Eric (2005): Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human 
Rights?‟ Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(6), pp. 925–953 
 
Poe, Steven C. & C. Neal Tate (1994): Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 
1980s: A global Analysis, American Political Science Review 88(4), pp. 853–872. 
 
Poe, Steven C Tanya Vazquez & Sabine Carey (2001): How are these Pictures Different: 
Assessing the Biases in the U.S. State Department‟s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 23, pp. 650-677. 
 
Poe, Steven C.; Neal Tate & Linda C. Keith (1999): Repression of Human Right to Personal 
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993‟, 
International Studies Quarterly 43, pp. 291–313. 
 15 
Poe, Steven C & Meernik, James (1995): US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 
Journal of Peace Research, 32 (4), pp. 399-411 
 
Richards, David L.; Ronald D. Gelleny & David H. Sacko (2001): Money with a Mean Streak? 
Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing 
Countries‟, International Studies Quarterly 45(2), pp. 219–239. 
 
Richards, David, R. Gelleny & D. Sacko (2001): Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic 
Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries, International 
Studies Quarterly 45(2), pp. 219-39. 
 
Richards, David L. (1999): Perilous Proxy: Human Rights and the Presence of National 
Elections" Social Science Quarterly 80 (4), pp. 648-665. 
 
Rogers, William H. (1993): Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, Stata Technical 
Bulletin, 13, pp. 19-23. 
 
Sen, Amartya (1999): Development as Freedom, A. Knopf, NY. 
 
Spar, Debora. (1999): Foreign Investment and Human Rights, Challenge 42(1): 55-80. 
 
Silja Eriksen & Indra de Soysa (forthcoming): A Fate Worse Than Debt? International Financial 
Institutions and Human Rights, 1981–2003, Journal of Peace Research 
 
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton & Steven E. Johnson. (1984): Human Rights and US Foreign 
Assistance  from Nixon to Carter, Journal of Peace Research 21, pp. 215-26. 
 
Sabine C Carey and Steven C Poe (eds) (2004): Understanding Human Rights Violations: New 
Systematic Studies, Ashgate, Aldershot 
 
Todd Landman (2005): The Political Science of Human Rights, British Journal of Political 
Science, 35 (3), pp. 549-572 
 
Tambovtsev, V. (1998.): Institutional dynamics in transition economy, Voproci Economiki, 5, pp. 
29– 40. 
 
Williams, Rick L. (2000): A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster-correlated Data, 
Biometrics, 56, pp. 645-46. 
 
Zanger, Sabine C (2000): A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life 
Integrity Violations, 1977-93, Journal of Peace Research 37, pp. 213-33. 
 
World Development Indicators (2006): World Bank (online) http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI 
 
Freedom house data, (online) http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
 
PTS database (online) http://www.unca.edu/~mgibney 
 
POLITY (1V) data (online) http://www.colorado.edu/ IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html 
 
 
 16 
ANNEXURES 
 
 
Annexure - 1 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Quality 
Cost of 
decline in IQ PIR ER PTS 
GDP 
growth rate 
Percapita 
GDP Population 
 Mean  45.65615 -0.114366  5.593750  6.318750  2.100000  0.327123  5779.544  18984512 
 Median  0.764000  0.000000  6.000000  6.000000  2.000000  2.649999  5757.568  8054267. 
 Maximum  1089.000  0.000000  8.000000  10.00000  5.000000  11.40000  15450.07  1.49E+08 
 Minimum  0.272000 -8.133072  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000 -30.90000  1220.020  1369513. 
 Std. Dev.  210.8897  0.767770  1.799010  2.592616  0.891610  7.746766  3668.704  32108319 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.002205  0.024901  0.000105  0.000000  0.004748  0.000000 
 Sum  7304.984 -18.29859  895.0000  1011.000  336.0000  52.33961  924727.0  3.04E+09 
 Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
 Cross sections 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
 
 
 
 
 Democracy 
Oil exports 
dummy 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Socialist 
Legal system Civil War Peace Years 
Reforms 
Years 
 Mean  3.681250  0.150000  0.380624  0.850000  0.081250  11.18750  0.110438 
 Median  7.000000  0.000000  0.374702  1.000000  0.000000  5.000000  0.099000 
 Maximum  10.00000  1.000000  0.688474  1.000000  1.000000  54.00000  0.244000 
 Minimum -9.000000  0.000000  0.028123  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.013000 
 Std. Dev.  6.156626  0.358193  0.182067  0.358193  0.274076  16.78955  0.054900 
 Probability  0.000011  0.000000  0.086688  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.010838 
 Sum  589.0000  24.00000  60.89988  136.0000  13.00000  1790.000  17.67000 
 Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
 Cross sections 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Note: ER = Empowerment Rights; PIR = Physical Integrity Rights; PTS = Political Terror Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
Annexure – 2 
 
Results of Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: Civil Liberties 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Model  2 
 
Model  3 
 
Constant 
5.890 * 
(0.958) 
5.890 * 
(0.961) 
5.891 * 
(0.960) 
Institutional Quality 
-0.001 + 
(9.85E-0) 
-0.001 *** 
(9.56E-0) 
---- 
Decline in Institutional Quality 
---- 0.001 
(0.015) 
---- 
Economic Growth 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
Log (Economic Development) 
-0.586 * 
(0.122) 
-0.586 * 
(0.122) 
-0.587 * 
(0.121) 
Log(Population) 
0.231 * 
(0.049) 
0.230 * 
(0.049) 
0.231 * 
(0.049) 
Democracy 
-0.100 * 
(0.013) 
-0.100 * 
(0.013) 
-0.100 * 
(0.013) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.306  
(0.382) 
-0.306 
(0.383) 
-0.304 
(0.382) 
Socialist Legal System 
-0.435 ** 
(0.167) 
-0.435 ** 
(0.167) 
-0.438 * 
(0.166) 
Civil War 
0.335 *** 
(0.193) 
0.335 *** 
(0.195) 
0.335 *** 
(0.194) 
Peace Years 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Number of Reform Years to Years in 
communist rule 
-8.983 * 
(2.521) 
-8.984 * 
(2.531) 
-8.973 * 
(2.519) 
Institutional Quality X Number of 
Reform years to years in communist rule ---- ---- 
0.175 * 
(0.054) 
Time 
0.175 * 
(0.054) 
0.175 * 
(0.055) 
-0.001 + 
(0.001) 
    
R-squared 0.823314 0.823314 0.823255 
Adjusted R-squared 0.810182 0.808891 0.810118 
S.E. of regression 0.600048 0.602085 0.600149 
Log likelihood 53.28846 53.28841 53.30641 
F-statistic -139.0738 -139.0738 -139.1008 
Prob (F-statistic) 62.69498 57.08215 62.66933 
Total Observations 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; & *** Significant at 
10% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-
Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
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Annexure – 3 
 
Transition economies under study 
 
Sl. No. Countries 
 
01 Armenia 
02 Azerbaijan 
03 Belarus 
04 Bulgaria 
05 Croatia 
06 Czech Republic 
07 Estonia 
08 Georgia 
09 Hungary 
10 Kazakhstan 
11 Kyrgyz Rep 
12 Latvia 
13 Lithuania 
14 Moldova 
15 Poland 
16 Romania 
17 Russia 
18 Slovakia 
19 Ukraine 
20 Uzbekistan 
 
